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Friday, May 30th, 2008 09:11 pm
Reposted from my Facebook:

Imagine the following scenario (a variation on the classic dilemma known as Newcomb's Problem):

About six months ago, a crack team of psychologists came up with a brilliant new device, and decided to run a curious experiment to test it. The experiment takes the following form:

  1. Each subject, chosen by lottery, is provided with the money to purchase two identical plain manilla envelopes.
  2. They and their envelopes are given free transportation to the lab, where they (but not the envelopes) fill out a survey.
  3. They wait approximately one hour, and then are ushered into the experiment room.
  4. In that room, they are permitted to examine three stacks - one containing twenty U.S. fifty-dollar bills, one containing twenty fifty-dollar-bill-sized pieces of blank U.S. fifty-dollar-bill stock, and one containing one thousand U.S. one-thousand-dollar bills.
  5. An attendant removes the stack of thousand-dollar bills. They are instructed to privately place one of the remaining stacks in each of their manilla envelopes, so that they would have two apparently-identical envelopes, and then signal.
  6. On the signal, the attendant returns with a case, which either does or does not contain the million dollars. The subject then gives either of their two envelopes in return for the case.


There is only one catch in this procedure: the case either contains blank bills or the million, as follows. If the psychologists predict the subject would return the envelope with the thousand dollars, the case contains the million. But if the psychologists predict that the subject will return the envelope with the blank paper, the case contains blank paper. And in each of the one hundred trials so far, the psychologists have always gotten it right. Everyone has either left with the thousand or left with the million.

(Edit: Well, not quite. A few clever people thought to randomize the envelopes so that they didn't know whether they lost the thousand or not. About half of them walked away with a thousand, the other half with nothing.)

The experiment is valid - it has been tested by dozens of experts in experimental protocol, sleight of hand, hypnotism, and every other relevant field. They neither coerce your choice nor switch out the million if you choose to keep the thousand.

You are in the room, with your two envelopes, and the attendant is before you with his case.

Do you give him the thousand dollars or the blank paper?
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 03:53 pm (UTC)
Hang on, I don't understand. Is this legitimate, the psychologists have been right 100% of the time? Or is this all just theoretical?
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 04:07 pm (UTC)
It's not actually happening, of course - it's just a philosophy exercise. But in the hypothetical, you have the fullest confidence that the test is legitimate and the psychologists have predicted correctly one hundred times out of one hundred - the only question that remains is what you will choose.
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 04:22 pm (UTC)
Oh! Okay. I do understand. So doesn't it come down to "pick the blank paper, get $1000000, don't pick it, get considerably less"?

I'm a little bit lost as to the exact mechanics.
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 04:37 pm (UTC)
Step 1: You take a test.
Step 2: They decide if you'll return the $1000. If they think you will, they put $1 000 000 in the case. If they think you won't, or they think you'll pull some shenanigans, they put blank paper in the case.
Step 3: The attendant walks in with the case, hands it to you, and leaves with whatever envelope you give him.

Thus, you get whatever was in the case plus whatever was in the envelope you kept. Simple as that.

(As for the prediction step, I don't know how they do it - all I know is that they've been right one hundred times out of a hundred.)
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 04:45 pm (UTC)
So return the $1000, be guaranteed the $1 000 000?
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 05:01 pm (UTC)
Technically, convince the psychologists you will return the $1000, be guaranteed the $1 000 000. Thus far, no-one has convinced the psychologists that they would return the $1000 except the people who actually do, however.
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 05:08 pm (UTC)
Yes, but if you're aware of the results, then you'd be aware that returning the $1000 garners you the million, right? So convincing the psychologists would be easy; if you're aware of the system, then they'd be aware that you're guaranteed to return the $1000, so they would know that you were going to, and put the $1 000 000 in the box.
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 05:23 pm (UTC)
Some people would reason the way you do about the problem - they would return the $1000 and leave with the $1 000 000.

That said, some people argue that by the time they have to decide whether to return the envelope, the million will either be there or not, and therefore they don't have to return the $1000 to have a chance at the million - they claim their odds of getting the million cannot be affected by which envelope they do, in fact, return, because the million is either already there or already not there. Such a person may then choose to keep the thousand, being as keeping the thousand doesn't change what's in their case. And, so far, every person reasoning that way has opened the case and found it with blank paper.
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 05:44 pm (UTC)
As far as I am aware, their position is actually pretty popular (see the link replying to [livejournal.com profile] goblinpaladin). In fact, the split is verifiably strange (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newcomb's_paradox):

In his 1969 article, Nozick noted that "To almost everyone, it is perfectly clear and obvious what should be done. The difficulty is that these people seem to divide almost evenly on the problem, with large numbers thinking that the opposing half is just being silly."


I think you can read the beginning of Nozick's essay here. (http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=gjA-OLUWiSUC&oi=fnd&pg=PA207&dq=%22Nozick%22+%229.+Newcomb%27s+problem+and+two+principles+of+choice%22+&ots=Fy51ZWvvM3&sig=pm1WNxRic_wiswB3ibGW8zy9zq0#PPA209,M1)
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 05:50 pm (UTC)
If there was a bit of doubt somewhere, then yes, I'd be able to see the argument of the other side. But one of the conditions is that the psychologists have 100% accuracy. With that in mind, I can't possibly see any justification for the other argument. If it were a real-life issue, then sure, free will and all that, but given that the box-givers have essentially already seen what you're going to do, there's absolutely no grey area.
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 06:03 pm (UTC)
Like the guy said - both sides find their decisions perfectly obvious. I can't tell you why.
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 06:08 pm (UTC)
My sister and I will frequently have long conversation threads on livejournal, holding two conversations simultaneously; one in the "message", and another in the subject.

Occasionally the conversation in "message" will reach a natural end, while the "subject" conversation will keep going, leaving awkward half-hearted messages in the comments.

The opposite is never a problem; subjects are completely optional, so low-effort subjects are fine. They're a step up from "no" subjects, even.
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 06:26 pm (UTC)
Ha! I was wondering where the subject-line thing came from!
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 06:33 pm (UTC)
Yes, I decided a long time ago to try to use as much of the system as was available to me. I always include subjects in comments and entries, and I always fill out music, location, and mood.

At the party I had tonight, someone mentioned how annoying it was that I don't use tags, so I'll have to add that to the list.
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 05:53 pm (UTC)
On a completely unrelated note, you don't know off-hand when the second game of Nomicide started, do you? I'm not particularly interested in going through the game that you played between the two games.

From a "person interested in reading the archives" point of view, by the way, the first game's ending is utterly bewildering. All the links point to the rule "The gostak distims the doshes flutzly.", but since the definition of each word changes all the time, I have no idea what actually happened, what rule everyone broke that gave you one hundred million points.

I could piece it together from the archives, but it's a daunting task, and not very reader-friendly.
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 06:11 pm (UTC)
November 10th, 2007. (http://community.livejournal.com/nomicide/2007/11/10/)

And you've got a really good point with the readability, there - it must make it hard to catch up, too. I'm not sure how one can fix it, except by having a Historian or something...
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 06:14 pm (UTC)
It's an interesting read, just frustrating at times. Surely you could edit those few entries that don't make sense out of context? Or would that infuriate the community?

You could use your NomicWiki page for a history of the game. It would take about 10 man-hours to do, but it would be worth it. I'm not suggesting you do it, perhaps you could delegate.
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 06:31 pm (UTC)
Eh, it's a lot of volunteer work - I'd probably want to make it pay off in-game first. ;)
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 06:19 pm (UTC)
It doesn't seem to be explicitly stated, so I'm just checking quickly before I get too far through the archives: did Game 2 start with just the basic rules, with the exception of the two that you changed?
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 06:29 pm (UTC)
It started with the Initial Ruleset, Game 2 (http://community.livejournal.com/nomicide/39030.html) - there was actually some pretty big changes, particularly the sponsorship deal.
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 06:35 pm (UTC)
Blech. I'm going to be honest, I hate it. I really liked the format of the first one. Which are we using for Game 3?
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 06:52 pm (UTC)
We haven't decided. I bet if you wrote a ruleset people liked, you could get in as Head and enact it, though!
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 07:02 pm (UTC)
Remind me what's wrong with the original ruleset?
Saturday, May 31st, 2008 07:08 pm (UTC)
The original ruleset is very general - it's not optimized for Internet play, and indeed it works very badly for Internet play, judging by almost every other LJ nomic that was attempted.

As far as the critical differences go, I think the main thing is the deadlines and the loosening of the everyone-must-vote criterion. If I were going back towards the original version, those are the changes I'd ask to keep.
Sunday, June 1st, 2008 04:27 am (UTC)
That all the LJ nomics to try it died quickly and horribly; using default Nomic on LJ, your nomic dies the moment someone either doesn't propose, or doesn't vote. This is a Bad Thing - so our base ruleset was designed around post-mortems of the other LJ nomics we could find, and I think we can be fairly confident that it worked.

On the other hand, if by 'original ruleset' you mean the one for the first game: there's nothing at all wrong with it, and I'd happily start with it again.
Sunday, June 1st, 2008 11:17 am (UTC)
Incidentally, if you're curious as to the 'default Nomic' i.e. Peter Suber's original game (http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/nomic.htm), it's online.
Sunday, June 1st, 2008 12:55 pm (UTC)
Shiny! Well, in that case, I'm all for the way we played the first game - i.e., slowly adding in complexity rather than having rules that were moderately tricky upfront.